Here is the recollection of James Casey regarding his trip to Togo.
As you can see, his list has now been extended to (Y)… which is a description of a MST-13 timer!
Casey acknowledges the presence of a 4th US Government employee but does not state that this person works at the CIA.
Casey alleges that the attempted overthrow was conducted by troops from neighboring GHANA, who were in turn, backed and supplied by LIBYA. To my knowledge, the government of Togo has never made such an allegation. The government of Togo has accused the governments of Ghana and Burkina Faso of involvement in the rebellion, and requested French military assistance on September 25, 1986.
Casey states that “access to prisoners” has not been granted. Surely, if he was interested in the origin of the MST-13 timer(s), it would have been obvious to question the prisoners about it. Casey contradicts Sherrow who stated in his FD302 (see below) that they declined to interview the rebels.
FBI-FD302 INTERVIEW OF CASEY (N15267)
The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent (SA) JAMES CASEY. During the time of the investigation, SA CASEY was employed as a Special Agent of the BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
On or about September 27, 1986, the reporting Agent, along with the BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS (ATF) experts RICHARD L. SHERROW and EDWARD OWENS and a fourth U.S. Government employee, departed WASHINGTON DULLES AIRPORT. After changing planes in Paris, the group continued on to COTONOU, BENIN, arriving there on September 28, 1986. The group then travelled by car to LOME, TOGO. The reason for flying to BENIN was that it had been reported that the airport in LOME was closed due to a military action.
After approximately two days in LOME, the group met with TOGO President EYADEMA. The President and a ranking military commander briefed the U.S. group basically reiterating a series of events that had been explained earlier. That series of events included an alleged attempt by outsiders to overthrow the Government of TOGO. President EYADEMA maintained then, as previously, that the attempted overthrow was conducted by troops from neighboring GHANA, who were in turn, backed and supplied by LIBYA. President EYADEMA then promised complete access to all information and equipment.
The U.S. Government group was taken to a military facility, where the following equipment was observed:
A). Three assault vehicles, alleged to have been used to assault the TOGO border. These vehicles had evidence of having been in action, including bullet holes, broken glass and blood. There were also ten smaller vehicles that allegedly had not been used, but were staged inside the TOGO border.
B). 36 assault rifles of East European manufacture.
C). Three (3) RPG-7 Soviet made grenade launchers.
D). Twenty (20) RPG-7 Soviet made rockets for use in equipment (c) above.
E). Seventeen (17) RPG-7 Soviet made motors for use in equipment (c) and (d) above.
F). One (1) RPG-7 Soviet made cleaning rod or blast deflector for use in equipment (c), (d) and (e) above.
G). Fifty-six (56) AKM-AK-47 magazines filled with 7.62 ammunition and tracer ammunition.
(i) Eight-nine (89) AKM-AK-47 empty magazines in webbed pouches.
H). Three (3) crates, each containing 1,400 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.
I). Eleven (11) pouches or small travel bags containing 50 to 150 rounds of 7.62 ammunition.
J). Seven (7) six-inch knives of various manufacture and descriptions.
K). Seven (7) Icom Japanese VHF transceivers with extra batteries.
L). One (1) pair of North Korean field glasses.
M). Two (2) Icom battery chargers for use in equipment (k) above.
N). Five (5) 9mm semi-automatic pistols of three different Western manufacturers.
O). approximately 25 extra 9mm ammunition cartridges.
P). Forty (40) Soviet made grenades, 30 with fuses intact.
Q). Four (4) cans of 10 each, of Soviet made grenade fuses.
R). Eleven (11) French made grenades with fuses.
S). Ten (10) bundles of approximately 10kg each of suspect TNT wrapped in burlap and dipped in wax.
T). two (2) plastic bags of suspect Semtex explosive, approximately 20kg each.
U). One (1) plastic bag of suspect Hexogin, approximately 20kg.
V). Approximately 100, two-foot strands of white suspect safety fuses with blasting cap.
W). Five (5) Belgian made helmets.
X). Uniform parts of various manufacture, none with official markings
Y). One timing device, described as being approximately 3.6 inches square, the designation “MST-13”, being found on the upper right hand corner. The device further contained two digits that could be set, two switches and a button designated as “test”.
The timing device described above was located in an area of the military base containing all the other weapons and vehicles. This area consisted of a hut-like building with only a thatch roof and walls that were approximately three feet high. The weapons were laid on tables that had been set up. The reporting Agent recalls only seeing one of the timing devices as described above.
During the next two days, the U.S. group was given access to a firing range. A number of weapons were test fired and experiments were conducted on some of the explosives. Some of the explosive materials, determined by ATF experts SHERROW and OWENS to be highly volatile TNT were destroyed for safety reasons.
Finally arrangements were made for the immediate transportation of several items back to the United States. The reporting Agent arranged for the transportation of; the electronic timing device, RPG-7 blast deflector, Soviet made ammunition, safety fuse, Soviet made grenade fuses and samples of explosives.
During the approximately five days the U.S. group was in LOME, TOGO, President EYADEMA and other Government officials promised access to alleged prisoners. These prisoners were supposed to be citizens and military officials from both TOGO and GHANA. However, as the week went on, access to the prisoners was never granted.
The U.S. group departed LOME, TOGO on October 4, 1986, changed planes and overnighted in Amsterdam, The Netherlands and arrived in Washington D.C. on October 5, 1986.
Here is an extract from Sherrow’s FD302.