Internal MEMO – 15/07/1991

“On Wednesday 10 July, Mr Feraday produced a copy of ‘SP LAB REPORT’ number
85SP002 (mentioned in last memorandum dated 8 July 1991); he had obtained it
from Mr R Seaney, Head of EC1 Division. Mr Feraday said that Mr Seaney was
unable to find the similar source document number 88SP006.


However some fifteen minutes later , Mr Seaney asked Mr Feraday to call at his office and on his return Mr Feraday was in possession of an original copy document of 88SP006. It
should be noted that this item bears the ‘Copy No. 257’ which does not correspond with the photocopy document mentioned in my previous memorandum (Copy No. 191). It would appear from Mr Feraday’s intonation that these documents are held by Mr Seaney and his departmental electronics engineer, Mr Jim Finlay (phonetic) has access to them.

Mr Feraday states that whilst researching PT/35 ‘in the early days’, he had asked Mr Finlay if he had any knowledge of timers/PCB of ‘green variety’. This was answered in the negative. Mr Feraday feels that had these documents been available to him at this time it would have been possible to identify PT/35 and it’s obvious source some 14/15 months ago.

Examination of the 88SP006 document shows beyond doubt that the timer
illustrated therein is one and the same as the item now referred to as ‘K1’. A
memorandum from Major PC Maynard, for Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
Operational Requirements (Land Systems), Ministry of Defence, Room 3142 and
dated 10.01.1986, shows that document 85SP002 was forwarded to Mr Seaney, RARDE,
Dr Whittlestone, RSRE (Army Electronics) and to GCHQ presumably on or about this

Here is the fulll document.


I have a simple question. Why 14/15 months? This only brings us back to April/May 1990. Certainly not to May 89 when the Timer fragment was allegedly discovered. Is Feraday telling us something in this INTERNAL MEMO?


This entry was posted in Chronology, Feraday, Thurman. Bookmark the permalink.


  1. Craig says:

    This memorandum and the content therein strikes at the heart of everything that is fundamentally flawed with the investigation and all proceedings there after on both sides of the Atlantic.
    Note this memorandum is addressed to SIO Henderson.

    Let’s put this in context:-
    1. There is quite rightly pro-active information and report sharing between CIA/FBI/MI5/RARDE. This memorandum is evidence to that. So there is a mechanism and facility in place, this isn’t just the odd report or facsimile being sent.

    2. The reports and movement of information are being recorded – see ‘copy no:191’ and also ‘copy no: 257’.
    This in itself destroys any suggestion of problems with information being available as RARDE had a system in place to not only record information but copies of same.
    The first question to ask is the disparity of the two copy numbers and who requested the copies ?

    3. In order to share information there would be the likes of working groups etc in place, Thurman freely admits he knew Feraday and previously liaised with RARDE folks etc.
    In the same manner UK & RARDE folks know Thurman and must have been in contact with Orkin* [Jack Christie] as his reports are being retained by RARDE et al.
    Orkin* has been with CIA technical operations from 1970 so a decent amount of knowledge and experience with regard to devices.

    3a. From the transcript there were was one unreported CIA representative from the ‘recovery’ team in Togo and a.n.other CIA representative present in Senegal.

    4. The record shows there was significant information noted as MEBO devices not once but two reports retained by RARDE.
    The MI5 explosives device expert noted MEBO immediately on request – See ‘The Box’ facsimile August 1990.

    5. Incredulously, Feraday states after ‘exhaustive enquiries’ he supposedly handed the identification over to Scottish police. From all reports the individual is dogmatic in approach.
    I’ve noted this before and repeat this – If Feraday at RARDE with all the aforementioned information at his disposal including numerous colleagues of many departments, why did or why would Feraday think Scottish police constables could identify something that RARDE, MI5, FBI, CIA retained information, representatives could not ?
    It’s counter intuitive and doesn’t make any sense whatsoever.
    The only thing the official line does do is create distance between RARDE and the Scottish police.

    6. With regard to the addressee of this memo – SIO Henderson.
    Well, what can one say… if SIO Henderson could ever claim no knowledge of a stitch-up was on the go before this he certainly knew on receipt of this memorandum.
    If matters were being appropriately handled and impartially dealt with an investigation should have taken place immediately with regard to this information.
    That did not happen and when it does not happen, issues of complicity rightly become the concern.

    In my view, at every level and every part of this investigation there are real concerns.
    The endless loose ends, the known information, the international visits, the identifications, the recording of exhibits, the non-recording of evidence, one could go on and on…

    It is evidently crystal clear this investigation is not only flawed but a total and complete disaster.
    There are more holes in this investigation than a Swiss cheese.


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