EZZEDIN HINSHIRI: DEFENCE PRECOGNITION

PRECOGNITION OF: EZZEDIN MOHAMED FARAJ AL HINSHIRI

[NOTE: I believe that this is an important document that must be read and studied carefully. Hinshiri’s statements regarding Bollier and the MST-13 Timers are particularly interesting.]

Taken at: The Offices of the Defence Consortium of Tripoli, Libya on 25th March 2000
By: A Duff and P Phillips

Ezzedin Mohamed Faraj Al Hinshiri states as follows:

Hinshiri2

Ezzedin Al HINSHIRI

1. My name is Ezzedin Mohamed Faraj Al Hinshiri. I was born in 1951 in Tarhuna, Libya. My address is Ain Zara, Tripoli.

2. I met Baset Megrahi in Cardiff in Rumny College. I was studying Marine Engineering.
When I arrived at the college, I enquired about the courses that were available there. I wanted to study something interesting. I met people who were studying Marine Engineering and decided to take that as a subject. However these were people with no roots, they were always travelling, they had no real social relations. I did not really like the people on the course. I come from a big family, and I wanted to come back to study in Tripoli and be near my family.

3. I am asked whether I remember a man called Hilifa Sherif. I am told that he was a supervisor and that he was married to a British woman. I do not remember this name.

4. I returned to Libya and I think I came back from the course before Baset. I was the first to give up. I disliked the place really. Some of the people that graduated from the course went on to take up jobs in maritime companies. I joined the Engineering Faculty in Tripoli
University when I came back. Lectures had already started for the course, so I was trying to catch up. I started studying engineering and communications. The University was called
Tripoli University and then it became Al Fatah University.

5. I do not know what Baset did when he came back, and I cannot remember exactly when I saw him, when he came back. I think it was 1980, something like that. I knew Mr Said Rashid. He studied with me at Tripoli University. He is my friend. Baset is a relative of mine. I should explain that the relationships are very close in Libya. You are always bumping into relatives. I have two connections with Baset. Baset’s father and the mother of my husband’s brother are related, and Baset’s brother’s wife married the sister of my wife.

6. I am asked what job I was doing in 1980. From 1980 I was in the broadcasting establishment in Libya until 1984/85. I was responsible for engineering and telecommunications.

7. Baset was working for LAA when I met him again. He was also studying in the Faculty of
Geography at the University of Garyounis. Said Rashid studied at the Al Fatah University, at the same time as me on an engineering course, then he worked in broadcasting as well.
8. At the end of 1984 I joined the JSO. I worked in the Engineering and Telecommunications Department, then I went to work in the Central Security Department. I was working as an assistant director then I became a director. The Central Security Department was responsible for the security in Libya. It is a Department within the JSO. [Witness did not want to go into exactly what the Central Security Department does]. I left the Central Security Department in 1988. At that time Ibrahim Bishari was the Head of the JSO.

9. In 1986 Baset was the Head of Airline Security and was seconded to the JSO. There were problems with the airlines at that time, and they wanted to make someone responsible for security. Baset was seconded to the JSO from LAA. I remember there were problems with the hijacking of aircraft and other problems at that time.

10. I am asked whether there was a problem with the quality of security or particular difficulties with LAA at that time. No I do not think so, I think there was a hijacking on a flight from Sabha to Malta.

11. I am asked whether I know Abdalla Sanoussi. I did know him, but I did not know his position at that time.

12. I am asked whether I knew that Baset was appointed as a director or a co-ordinator for the Centre Strategic Studies and why he was given this job. I knew that Baset was appointed as a director of the CSS. He had studied quite a lot, and he had a degree. Nobody likes to go back to the same position, and maybe this is the reason why
he took the job. I knew Captain Hannushi. He was the chairman of LAA. I do not think that Baset and he had a very good relationship, but they were on the committee of LAA together.

13. I am asked whether I know what the CSS do, and what my understanding of their function is. It would prepare studies on particular subjects, relating to the administration of the State. There were a lot of professors there, people from the University who were working at this place.

14. I am asked what connection the CSS had with the JSO. The only connection would be the need for certain studies to be carried out by the JSO. They would say we need a study done on this or that. Any security service in the world has these connections. The CSS worked for a lot of government departments, not just the JSO; studies would be undertaken by them.

15. I would visit Baset from time to time at the CSS. I would read magazines and books at the Centre.

16. I am asked whether I ever read any of the studies that were carried out by the CSS.
I would read studies that were related to other countries, for example, industry in another
country or about agriculture, or a study about the Toureg, a study in tribal relations.

17. I am asked whether the CSS could get newspapers and/or magazines that were not available elsewhere in Libya. All centres have access to these things.

18. I am told that Abdalla Senoussi has said that magazines and newspapers were available there that were not available in shops. This is true, but there were also other centres. There was the Centre for Information, and the Centre for the Economic Studies. At that time you could not buy magazines in the shops freely.

19. I am asked whether the CSS was paid for by the JSO. I do not know about this, Omar Abu Khanjar was the administrator of the Centre at the time. He would know.

20. I am asked whether I ever visited Baset at the Centre, and whether it was a building only on one level or two levels. I visited Baset at the Centre when it was a single storey building and then it became a two storey building.

21. I am asked whether the building was guarded or whether it was secured by a security guard. It was not. There was only an old man there, and I see him now, he is still there, he is like a concierge. You always have old people for these functions. You did not have to fill out visitors cards, there were no fences, no dogs, and no people with guns!

22. Towards the end of 1987 or at the beginning of 1988 I became the Minister of Justice for the Municipality of Tripoli. There was no overall Minister of Justice at that time, in charge of all municipalities in Libya. As Minister of Justice for the Municipality of Tripoli, I was in charge of the courts, civil defence of Tripoli, normal police functions, normal reports, normal court functions, and all the normal administrative duties. I was in that position until 1989, and then I became the Minister of Justice for the whole of Libya. I was asked to re-establish the position, and I was supposed to restore this position. I was the Minister of Justice for the whole of Libya from 1989 to 1991. Then I became the Minister of Transport from 1991 to 1992.

23. At the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, I became the Head of the Railway Company of Libya. There were big projects at that time to develop the rail network throughout Libya. At the end of 1993 I became the Minister of Transport and Communications again. It was always called the Ministry of Transport and Communications and it included responsibility for things such as telephones. I held this position until last month, when everything changed, because positions were reshuffled. I am currently the Head of the Department of Transport and Communications, because there is no ministerial position anymore. It has been abandoned.

24. In 1984, I was in the JSO. I was an engineer in telecommunications, then I became an
assistant to the director, and in 1985 I was made Head of the Central Security Administration. I would agree that I had a fairly meteoric rise through the ranks.

25. I am asked about MST – 13 timers, and the ordering of these timers. I am asked what my role was in this. I am asked specifically whether I ordered these timers from Bollier and Meister. Yes I did. We had a war between Libya and Chad at that time, and we had many military operations in Chad. Mr Ibrahim Bishari, the Head of the JSO at the time, asked us. The military needed telecommunications and other things. They needed communications equipment for military purposes. The JSO have to procure this equipment, because the Military do not have the necessary connections and relations to get hold of this equipment.

26. I knew Bollier from my time in broadcasting. Bollier was here in Tripoli, and we had
purchased satellite receivers and such things from him. I told him what we needed, and he
went back to Switzerland and got them. We took them to Ibrahim Bishari, the timers, and I do not know what happened after that. Mr Bishari asked the Military what they needed.
There were military camps in the desert, and if they wanted to destroy the camps after
occupying them, they would use timers and explosives. We told Bollier what we needed and why we needed them. We did not specify the make of timer required or specify that it should be in a box so that the sand could not get into it. We only told Bollier the purpose for which we required the timers, we did not give any specifications for the timers. We only said that we needed them to be set for a long time, like a year. Said Rashid worked with me. We are both engineers. Said Rashid was in the JSO. He was just an engineer.

27. Said Rashid was with me in Tripoli when we met Bollier for the first time, then he was no longer involved. Bollier finished his work in Tripoli and went back to Switzerland after the meeting. Bollier was here in Libya for other work.

28. I am asked how long it was before Bollier came back to Tripoli. I do not know.

29. I am asked whether Bollier accompanied people to observe tests in the desert. I heard that they made tests with Bollier present during the tests in Sabha in the desert. I think he brought two lots of timers, and there were two shipments. I think it was 29 timers
that he brought. When the timers were ordered we did not ask him for a specific number of timers, it was his choice or decision to bring 29 timers. We had nothing to do with the
number of timers. He bought the timers to my office in the JSO in Tripoli. It was the place
that became a hospital.

30. I am asked when we received the timers were they in their casings. Some of the timers were in their casings and some were not I think. They were different.

31. I am asked whether in order to set these timers, they had two wheels. I do not know about this.

32. We took the timers to Bishari direct, and he made contact with the military.

33. I am asked whether Bollier gave us some spare bits of circuit boards. He did not.

34. I am asked whether Bollier delivered any timers to anyone else in Libya. Not as far as I am aware.

35. I am told that the Scottish police asked about an individual called Mustapha in the Libyan People’s Bureau in East Berlin. I do not know this person Mustapha.

36. I am asked how the timers were paid for. Payment for the timers would be made by the military through the JSO. I gave the timers to Mr Bishari, and they went to the military. I am responsible for security in Libya and I heard that one man went to Sabha to carry out tests. I do not know what was tested. I knew about the tests, but not what they were testing.

37. I am told that Bollier says that the timers were brought to Sabha by someone called Colonel Nassr. I am asked whether I know Colonel Nassr Ashur. Yes I do know him.

38. I am asked why Nassr Ashur would take the timers to Sabha. I do not know, maybe Nassr Ashur accompanied him (Bollier). If Nassr Ashur was there, he may have been there for translation purposes.

39. I am asked whether Nassr Ashur worked for the JSO. I am not sure, I think he was responsible for the foreign information. I think he was responsible for dealing with the foreign press. Even if he was part of the JSO, I did not know him very well.

40. I am asked, after I gave these timers to Ibrahim Bishari, did I keep in contact with Bollier. Yes I did. When I was at the Ministry of Justice, we asked Bollier to provide
communications for police cars and communications to the police stations.

41. I am asked whether I ordered any more timers from Bollier. No I did not. In 1988, when I was in the Ministry of Justice there was a problem with mines. There were problems with mines all over Libya, which were the mines left from the Second
World War. These were Italian, British and German land mines. There were lots of mines,
and we started a crash programme to get rid of these mines. I commissioned a report on this, on the location of mines throughout Libya. I asked Bollier whether he could provide timers to destroy the mines. I am asked how I contacted him. Bollier was here in Tripoli, I think. I am asked whether I asked Badri Hassan to ask Bollier. No I did not, although I know that Badri knows him. I did not specify the timers that were required, I did not say that we needed another batch of the same timers. I met him in my office, and I think he brought 40 timers. The price was too high for these timers. I was in charge of the Municipality of Tripoli at this time, and I recognised the problem with the land mines and I wanted to deal with it. In 1988 when I became the Minister of the Justice for the whole of Libya, I commissioned a report to deal with the problems of mines throughout Libya.

42. I am asked when Bollier came back, whether I checked the prices of timers before he came to see me. I am told that Bollier says that I produced a fax at a meeting showing him a price list for the timers for Germany, showing lower prices. I cannot remember this. I told Bollier that we could buy timers from anywhere. You can use these timers in domestic appliances such as washing machines. They are not just for military use, they are not special military timers.

43. I am asked whether I know how timers are used to blow up land mines, and I am asked whether the report that I commissioned recommended the use of timers. I got the report from the Civil Defence Authorities. In the report I remember they said that you needed to fence off whole areas where landmines were situated and blow up the whole area. The alternative was that you put timers on the mines with explosives. The Civil Defence Authorities have explosives.

44. As far as I can recall, the question of mines was a matter that was put to the UN. A Clearance Agreement was signed with Italy i.e. between Libya and Italy. Italy agreed to make apologies and make indemnities or reparations. The Government of Italy apologised and reparations were paid. These documents should be available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

45. I am asked whether I have a driver called Ali, who picked up Bollier from the airport. Yes I can remember, I had a driver called Ali.

46. I am asked whether I remember Bollier coming on one trip with a suitcase, and that the suitcase disappeared. I do not remember this.

47. I am asked where I kept the timers which we did not purchase, because the price was too high. I kept the timers in my office and sent them to the airport to be picked up by Bollier.

48. I am told that Bollier said that when he got back to Switzerland he looked at the timers and he said that one of them had been set. I am asked whether I know anything about this, and whether I did it. I do not know anything about this. It was not me.

49. I am told that the timer was not connected to anything, it was just set for a Wednesday. I do not know about this.

50. I am told that it was an Olympus timer, and when Bollier got back to his desk, and started to take the batteries out of the timers, as it was not good to keep the batteries attached, he saw one of the timers was set for Wednesday. I am told that he said that little bells were set for Wednesday at 19:30 hours. I am told that he got Mr Meister to look at the timer and he saw it set, and then Bollier disconnected the batteries and the display went blank. All I can say is why would Bollier think about this before the plane crash then suddenly remember the whole thing after Lockerbie. After the plane crash perhaps it would mean something, but if you saw this before the plane crash, it would not mean anything.

51. I am asked whether I know how to set timers. I do not. This is a matter for specialist people.

52. I am asked whether anyone else could have had access to the timers whilst they were in my office. The answer is no. They were sent back in a bag to the airport, so that Bollier was not searched.

53. I am asked whether there was a Technical Department at that time in the JSO. I cannot talk about this.

54. I am asked whether there was someone working in the Technical Department at the JSO at the time called Abougela Mas’ud. I do not know.

55. I am asked whether I had contact with Bollier after this, after 1988. Yes I think I travelled to Switzerland after 1988.

56. I am asked whether Mr Meister got visas for me and my family. People in high positions in Libya have these things done for them.

57. My name is Ezzadin Mohamed Faraj. I am asked if there was a telex from the Swiss Embassy to Tripoli in the name of Izzadin Al Faraj whether this is likely to be me. I cannot say. If it was Hinshiri it would definitely be me, if not, it is not certain.

58. I am asked whether I knew that Badri Hassan had a company called ABH. Yes I knew this. I knew Badri. He was working in the airlines. There was a problem at that time with the embargo from the Americans, so we asked Badri to get spare parts for our aircraft. He was working for the Ministry of Transport and Communications. There is also a social relationship there between Badri and I.

59. I am asked whether I know that Baset had a special relationship with Badri. Yes I did know this, they both worked at LAA, then they were partners in ABH. There were a few of them.

60. I am asked whether the Libyan Government put any money into ABH. No it did not.

61. When I was working in the Municipality of Tripoli, ABH purchased telecommunications equipment for the police cars, and they supplied this equipment to us. The Government did not pay any money to ABH to set it up. There is no relationship between any government department and ABH that I am aware of. We dealt with them to purchase telecommunications and aviation parts. We gave them business. If there is a payment shown in ABH accounts for 5000 Libyan Dinars, this would be for equipment.

62. I am asked about Abdulmajid Giaka. I know that he is in the US.

63. I am told that he says that ABH was a shell company or a front company set up for JSO activities and that money was put in by me and that I gave Baset money to put in ABH. Giaka is crazy. I was not responsible for funding that company or for funding any of Baset’s activities. The funds transferred to ABH were for business activities. We tried to give them business other than the purchase and supply of aviation spare parts, so they could keep going, because they would not have been able to survive on the supply of aviation parts only at the time. They did not make sufficient money. The work that we gave them included importing Volkswagen, Audi and Opel cars as police cars. I would tell the departments responsible for buying or purchasing to offer the contract to ABH, and to put their name on the tenders. I would tell the people in the purchasing department that ABH is a good company and trustworthy. I facilitated this for Badri. I would tell Badri about the other people tendering for jobs, and tell him the prices, so that he could undercut them. These other companies were not supplying aviation parts.

64. I am asked about the visit to Nigeria and Baset’s request to me to obtain for him a coded passport. For the spare parts and to defeat the embargo we made coded passports. I remember Baset tried to contact Nigeria. I cannot remember this particularly, but I do remember that Baset contacted Nigeria to get the spare parts. We used to use coded passports in general, it was all done through the Immigration Department.

65. A Duff said that he had seen the application form for Baset’s coded passport to the Immigration Department, and under the heading “Position” it says that he is civilian as opposed to military. There is a section that says either military or civilian. It is filled out “civilian”, but there is another section which says position and reason for application, and it says “Mutawin”.

66. I am asked what I would understand this expression “Mutawin” to mean.
It means the person is not a member of the JSO. It means he is just asked to do missions when needed, for spare parts, or for training. He is not a permanent employee or a member of staff. He is just asked to do a couple of things from time to time.

67. I am asked about Baset’s trip to Yugoslavia when I accompanied him and I am asked what the purpose of this trip was. We have got good relations with Yugoslavia. We asked Baset to come with us to get assistance in security, training and spare parts. Yugoslavia had an institute for training people. The Yugoslavian airline had a Training Institute. We visited this Institute. It was after 1986 I think.

68. I am asked about the trip to Cairo for a conference on Arab Sat, the Arab satellite company. Baset was invited on this trip. It was a delegation. There were many people. It was a;delegation of Ministers.

69. I am told that there is an allegation by the prosecution that Baset is a high ranking member of the JSO. He was a teacher. He is not a member of the JSO. He is a very sophisticated man. He is well educated, and he is a soft man. He has good morals.

70. I am asked whether he is a decent person. He is a decent person. He forms part of the youth who formed the revolution. I was very surprised when he was accused. I do not think that he could even kill a chicken. He certainly could not explode an aeroplane.

71. I am asked about certain interviews that Giaka has given to the American authorities. I am told that Giaka said that he worked in the JSO Technical Division. He worked in the workshop. He said that he was not happy. I was the Head of the Central Security Administration in 1985. He came to me and said that he had resigned. I remember that he came to me and said that he wanted to change his position. I told him that he would have to follow normal procedures, that I could not help him. I did not call the Head of the JSO for him. You would not call the Head of the JSO to ask about a mechanic.

72. Giaka was a member of the Revolutionary Committee, and so was I. Every Revolutionary Committee has its own headquarters. In Tripoli it had a building. Giaka was a member of the Revolutionary Committee. He would write a lot about other people in reports. He even wrote a report against his father.

73. I am asked what Giaka’s background and education and training was. I think he has a certificate which is a training course for mechanical or electrical. The Revolutionary Committees all met in these places.

74. I am asked whether Giaka was a zealot, a revolutionary zealot. I would say that Giaka was very extreme. He would always be present in these meetings and conferences.

75. I am asked about the reports that Giaka wrote, and specifically I am asked whether these reports would be him denouncing his neighbours or something like that. They were not like this, these reports. He only wrote reports relating to security, and anything
that he sees or hears that affects security. He would write anything about anything.

76. I am asked whether he attached himself to me when he approached me in the JSO.
There is about ten years between us. I remembered him from the Revolutionary Committees, and I know that he would try and get close to influential people.

77. I am asked whether Al Arabi was my former secretary (page 6 of the second FBI interview). He was not, he was a Revolutionary Member, but he is not my secretary. He just does private business. I remember the name of the place where the Revolutionary Committee used to meet was called Mutaba.

78. I am asked whether I am aware of any of the jobs held by Giaka in the JSO (page 14 second FBI interview). I knew that Giaka went into aviation into Malta, but I do not know his career. I do not remember him visiting me or Rashid. Why would I be nervous about Giaka seeing Rashid?

79. I am asked whether I objected to Giaka’s resignation (page 18 second FBI interview).
I was not in the JSO in 1990, so I would not object to his resignation. I was the Minster of
Justice or the Minister of Transportation and Communications.

80. I am asked whether I heard about Giaka asking to resign from the JSO? I remember that Giaka approached me when he came back from Malta and came back to see me at the Ministry of Justice to ask for my help. He wanted to get permission to marry a Maltese woman. The only discussion we had related to the permission that he required to marry a Maltese woman.

81. I am asked whether I spoke to Younis Al-Ejali, Abdulla Sanoussi’s secretary regarding
Giaka’s resignation. I never spoke to this person. I did not speak to anyone about Giaka’s resignation.

82. I am told in his discussions with the FBI, Giaka is trying to paint a picture of a very close relationship with me, that I acted as his friend, champion and mentor. This is not true. I knew him in the Revolutionary Committees, and I knew him in the JSO. I would try and help or solve problems for people that came from the Revolutionary Committees, but I did not have a close relationship with Giaka. He is not my friend. He is just one member working in the Organisation. There was no social relationship at all. I did not know him in Malta, when he was there. I have never contacted him myself at any time, within Malta or Tripoli or wherever. He does not work in my office. My office is Libya and my office stretches from the border in the east to the west!

83. I am asked whether I know Lamin Fimah. I did not know him before he was accused of this crime of Lockerbie. Lamin may have known me as a public figure.

84. I am asked what communications I had with him, if any, when he was accused of the crime. I saw him I think with Baset once or twice after he was accused of the crime.
[A Duff pointed out that both Mr Hinshiri and Mr Rashid were cautioned when they were
seen by the Scottish police, and their intentions are not clear].

85. I am asked whether I have ever heard of a company called Med Tours I have not heard of any such company. I never had any relationship with Lamin Fhimah. I never knew him before the accusation.

86. I am asked whether I gave any money to Lamin Fhimah or to Med Tours either directly or indirectly. I have told you that I have no connection with Lamin Fhimah. No money was transferred to him.

87. I am told about the allegation that is made by Giaka that I gave Lamin approximately
US$189,000 for Med Tours. This just did not happen. I have no connections with Lamin Fhimah and I have given no money to him or any of his companies.

88. I am asked whether I have held the following positions; Minister of Justice, Secretary General to the Peoples’ Committee for Justice, Libya, Director of Central Security in the JSO, Assistant to the Director for Central Security in the JSO and Minister of Transportation (page 60 of the second FBI Interview). I have held all of these positions.

89. I am asked whether I was appointed by Colonel Qadhafi to the Engineering Directorate, together with Said Rashid, and whether he was in an Armoured Division of Electronic Support for the Libyan Military. Colonel Qadhafi has no authority to appoint anyone. There is no such division as an Armoured Division of Electronic Support for the Libyan Military. Nothing exists like that. Certainly not that I am aware of.

90. I am asked whether I am born in Chad and speak fluent French. I was not born in Chad (he laughs at this), and I do not speak French fluently. I can speak conversational French and order a beer. I was born in Tarhuna, sixty or seventy kilometres away from Tripoli. There is no one from Chad in my family, not in my grandparents or from anyone.

91. I am asked whether I was a member of the Student Revolutionary Committee in Tripoli. I was a member of the Student Revolutionary Committee, but I was never their leader. There is no head of the Committee, this is the point, all of the members are at the same level.

92. I am told that Giaka has alleged that the Qadhafi government liquidated the students and professors at the university in Tripoli who acted as dissidents against the new Qadhafi party. This is what Libyan people who live outside Libya say all the time. They always say that there is liquidation of dissidents. There are pamphlets published in the US on this subject. It is not true.

93. I am told that Giaka has alleged that together with Said Rashid, I liberated Thomas Sincera from prison in Libya. I have never head of him. Is he the President of the Ivory Coast?

94. I am told that Giaka has said that I must have had some assignment from Colonel Qadhafi that required me to keep a low profile, because my notoriety as a participant in ferreting out Libyan dissidents was not as great as that of other people (see page 61 second FBI interview). This is nonsense. I am a public figure. I cannot keep a low profile and I have not kept a low profile since I started, I have been a member of the Revolutionary Committee. I am always on television.

95. I am asked whether Ahmed Al-Sokni is Said Rashid’s secretary. He is not. He works in the electronic company.

96. I am told that it is alleged that in 1984 I had a meeting with Giaka and Rashid when Giaka was told by Rashid that Rashid wanted to attempt to revive the Revolutionary Committee within the JSO, and that subsequent to this meeting I am supposed to have had a secret meeting with him, and that I am supposed to have contacted Giaka together with Rashid. This is rubbish. Giaka had no meeting with me and Rashid, and I have not had a secret meeting with him. I would meet Giaka in the Revolutionary Committees, but why would I ask him to meet me privately in my office or in an office? Just because you are a member of the Revolutionary Committee it does not make you a special person in work, in particular in the JSO. There is no need to revive the Revolutionary Committee in the JSO.

97. I am told that Giaka has said that he had a meeting with me and Rashid, and we would clear our desks and cover all of our papers when he entered the room. This is again a ridiculous allegation.

98. I am asked whether I know Zadma. I do know Zadma, he was a director of the JSO. He is dead now.

99. I am told that Giaka has said that there was a call for all members of the JSO to meet at JSO headquarters in Bin Ashur Street in Tripoli for a general meeting. I know nothing of this. It is impossible for all members of the JSO to come together in one meeting.

100. I am told that Giaka has alleged that there were five people within the Libyan Government who acted as “fronts” or people who would purchase various supplies for the Government. I am told that he has named me, Rashid, Zadma, Sanussi and Tuhami Khalid. This is nonsense.

101. I am told that Giaka has said that I travelled to Malta with Colonel Qadhafi in 1984 or 1985. I did travel to Malta with Colonel Qadhafi in 1984-1985.

102. I am asked whether there was a Defensive Security Survey carried out on Malta before this trip, in particular at the airport. I am not at liberty to talk about this. It is private.

103. I am told that Giaka has said that I instructed Al Arabi to take a briefcase in either 1985 or 1986 containing US$240,000 in cash to someone in Turkey. I know nothing about this. I never asked Al Arabi to do such a thing for me.

104. I am told that Giaka has said that I travelled in October 1986 with Captain Abdaalti
Mohammed Hussein to Malta on an Air Malta flight from Tripoli, and that I am supposed to have used an alias when I entered Malta because I was wanted by Interpol.
I do not remember going to Malta with a coded passport. I could have travelled with a coded passport, but at that time, I was a Minister, so I would not have had one. I do not know if I am wanted by Interpol. I do know that England refused me a visa when I was supposed to go and be the Secretary of the Libyan People’s Bureau in London, which is
the same position as Ambassador. They refused me the visa.

105. I am told about the suggestion that Abdaalti Mohammed Hussein was planning to stay in Malta for approximately a week to purchase some office supplies and clothes for me. He is not my secretary.

106. I am told that Giaka has said that Mr Hussein and I switched hotel rooms for “security reasons” (see page 64 of the second FBI interview). This is not true. It is rubbish. We walked around like normal people.

107. I am told that Giaka has said that Izzeldin Makhlouf, who is alleged to be a member of the Libyan Revolutionary Guard, told Giaka that I was wanted by Interpol, and that during early 1988, Makhlouf was travelling through Malta when he was arrested by the Maltese authorities because they thought he was me. I do not know anything about this. I went to Malta after 1988 and they never arrested me. I have a brother and a cousin who are members of the Revolutionary Guard. All citizens are members of the Revolutionary Guard.

108. I am told that Giaka has said that I have three offices in Tripoli. I have more than three offices. As I have said, the whole of Libya is my office.

109. I am told that Giaka has said that my father’s brother, Ahmed Hinshiri, works for Mohamed Al Nayly. I do not know about this. No he does not.

110. I am told that Giaka has said that he was in a section of the JSO set up to recruit informants in Libyan institutions (see Grand Jury transcript page 23). There are branches for this maybe, but Giaka did not have responsibility for them, he may have been a member of this branch, but not a supervisor.

111. I am told that Giaka has said that he is military trained. . (See page 55 of the transcript of the Grand Jury). I do not think that he is.

112. I am told that Giaka has said that I got him the job at LAA, and that I asked him to work at LAA (page 3 of police interview). I did not.

113. A Duff said that Giaka is clearly trying to give the impression of a special relationship, and that I was looking after Giaka and that he was almost like a protégé. This is not true. I did not treat him like my protégé. I did not really look after him.

114. I am informed that I am named in the Indictment in relation to the ordering of timers
(paragraph 1(j) and paragraph 2(b)).

115. I am prepared to come to Holland to give evidence, depending on the circumstances. If the circumstances were right I would come.

(A Duff and P Phillips thought that he came across very well as a witness. He is not prepared to talk about certain matters, but he is quite cool and confident and articulate. He speaks some English, but would need a translator.

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6 Responses to EZZEDIN HINSHIRI: DEFENCE PRECOGNITION

  1. Scott says:

    Hinshiri statements re: Megrahi and Giaka —-
    “I am asked whether he (Baset) is a decent person. He is a decent person. He forms part of the youth who formed the revolution. I was very surprised when he was accused. I do not think that he could even kill a chicken. He certainly could not explode an aeroplane.” — we now know 99.99999% that assessment to be true.

    “I am asked whether I remember Bollier coming on one trip with a suitcase, and that the suitcase disappeared. I do not remember this.” — in what year is this incident alleged to have taken place?

    “Giaka was a member of the Revolutionary Committee. He would write a lot about other people in reports. He even wrote a report against his father.” — Giaka’s family must be so proud.

    “You can use these timers in domestic appliances such as washing machines” — ???

    ” We only told Bollier the purpose for which we required the timers, we did not give any specifications for the timers. We only said that we needed them to be set for a long time, like a year.” — now why would you need timers that could be set up to one year in advance to blow up camps in Chad?

    Scott

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    • Ludwig says:

      Dear Scott,

      You ask: “why would you need timers that could be set up to one year in advance to blow up camps in Chad?”

      I believe that in 85, the Libyan Military wanted to booby trap their own camps in the desert in case they would not be able to return to them. Hinshiri gave a more precise timescale in another interview. He said they (the military) wanted a timescale of about one month and up to four months.

      Perhaps, you remember that I once asked you a question about the power consumption of the MST-13 timer. (My mistake. I had asked this question to another reader of this blog: Brendan O. ) More later about this… I managed some estimate and I do not believe that the battery would last more than about one month… (This needs to be confirmed.)

      So a 2 digits timer (99 hours – TOGO type) is not suitable for the job as requested. And a four digits timer (9999 Hours- SENEGAL Type) will quit working long before 4 months…

      Regards, Ludwig

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  2. Morag says:

    If Megrahi was manoeuvred to catch LN147 on the morning of 21st December 1988, thus placing him in a potentially incriminating position in respect of the flight that would have connected Malta to PA103 if the bomb had indeed come from Malta as opposed to being introduced at Heathrow – who would have manoeuvred him?

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  3. Craig says:

    Gaika – I think there can be little doubt if any remained Gaika is a crackpot, nothing but a stooge. For this individual to be presented as a Crown ‘star witness’ is ridiculous, also highlights the distrustful decision making of Crown at trial with regard to the CIA cables and the noted information contained therein.

    Amongst other things, Gaika is described as a ‘walk-in’ to US authorities in Malta, 10th August 1988. If one reads back the cables from 10th August 1988, it appears this is not the complete story. It is noted Gaika was recruited, sorry, accompanied by a Maltese woman as both a ‘friend’ and as a ‘translator’.
    It is noted Gaika’s English was extremely limited and the ‘friend / translator’ was of course present throughout the initial meeting and subsequent clandestine meetings at various place’s including safe houses etc, discussing many topics including contact plans with US representatives, security and the like.
    Indeed, the ‘translator’ is the direct US contact to agree and set-up further meetings with Gaika including their clandestine location.

    Take a step back and think how much the ‘translator’ was involved and the sensitivity of the involvement and information sharing.
    As a suggested chance encounter, the noted female ‘translator’ must have had the most high level US security clearance operating in Malta at that time.

    Ask the questions and think about the surrounding circumstances –
    Why is there no interviews with the ‘translator’ separate to Gaika ?
    For obvious reasons, surely one would need to enquire or vouch her credentials first ?
    Who did she work for ?
    Where did the female ‘friend / translator’ [with security clearance] work ?
    At the airport ?
    Did Gaika go looking for CIA or did CIA go looking for a Gaika ?

    When any matter is being dealt with through a translator the dynamics completely change and the translator becomes the power base of the exchange. As an example, one can see this trust issue repeatedly played out at the trial.
    Using a translator, parties become vulnerable because everything is reliant on complete trust of the translator.

    I find it inescapable the ‘friend / translator’ was not known or associated with US authorities before Gaika appeared.
    ———————————————————
    1985 and MST-13
    There are several interesting exchanges noted within trial transcript, PDF pages 1178 to 1187

    One has to take into consideration the SP85002 report which was produced approximately between October – December 1985
    A UK MOD memorandum noting this report was received at RARDE, 10th January 1986.
    As we know, Mebo at the very, very least provided Chad ‘recovered’ related information to the Swiss authorities at the behest of the US authorities.
    This must have happened during 1985, at least before late 1985 to be included in the report.

    For Mebo to selflessly provide Libyan associated sales information to the Swiss [handlers] authorities during 1985, surely they must realize a ‘recovery’ of a Mebo device has occurred and unless the Swiss intelligence authorities are roaming around Africa with their infamous army knives, Mebo could only ascertain the Swiss authorities were enquiring on behalf of a friendly nation.

    Trial transcript – Pages 1178-1187
    Its very difficult to reference each page as certain issues jump from page to page, I suggest best to read yourself and draw your own conclusions.

    Comments –
    Bollier attempted to maintain the initial concept for the device was from the Libyans, either Said Rashid or Ezzedin Hinshiri which was a meeting during the summer of 1985, noted as between 4/7/1985 to 16/7/1985 from Bollier passport.
    Hence, if correct, this would chronologically refer to Thuring August 1985 etc etc.

    Furthermore, it became apparent that two devices has been provided to the Stasi on or around 25/2/1985
    Clearly, this strikes out the Libya device concept of summer or July 1985.

    Bollier stated only 3 laboratory prototypes boards were made but 2 of the 3 were then included in 2 prototype devices which were given to the Stasi, 25/2/1985
    Bollier states the 3rd board was thought to be thrown away but also states Lumpert provided this to the Swiss.

    10/2/1985 – Bollier to Libya
    15/2/1985 – Bollier return to Zurich
    25/2/1985 – Bollier to Stasi

    4/7/1985 – Bollier to Libya
    16/7/1985 – Bollier to Zurich

    Clearly we have a problem with how many, where and at what time period. I would also suggest regardless how one disseminates the information, Mebo definitely has a problem.

    1. IF Bollier presented a prototype device to Libyan officials 10/2/1985, clearly it was not a Libyan generated concept. Almost a fait accompli of a device to the Libyans.
    Furthermore, Bollier then went directly to the Stasi 25/2/1985 to hand over 2 devices.
    Possibly not the best way to do business even for an IED manufacturer.

    2. Bollier attended a meeting in Libya 4/7/1985 to 16/7/1985, he could not have shown the Libyans anything as he had given the Stasi the only 2 prototype devices.
    At this meeting, the Libyan representative couldn’t have requested or provided a concept of this timing device because Mebo had already completed this.

    One cannot initiate a requirement or conception for the same thing twice.

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  4. Scott says:

    I wonder if the female Maltese translator Is the Maltese lady he claims he wanted to marry??

    Like

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